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1. Introduction
Chapter sixteen of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) "reflects the
preferential trading relationship between the parties" as it covers the temporary entry for
business persons) NAFTA is a free trade agreement that not only must set guidelines for
trading-the movement of goods and services between Canada, Mexico, and the United
States-but also for the movement of people. If the people cannot functionally and
efficiently travel from one country to the next, then clearly trade under NAFTA would
be inhibited. Goods need to be delivered to the respective country and of course, services
need to be provided-neither of which can be done without the movement of persons.
However ridiculous or simple this issue of allowing people to cross borders appears
in order for productive trading, it has become a realistic concern and has indeed caused
frustrations under NAFTA. For example, simply by analyzing article 1601 "General
Principle," one begins to understand the inherent contradictions within.' Article 1601
"declare[s] the fact that the NAFTA's immigration provisions should reflect the 'preferential
trading relationship between the parties, the desirability of facilitating temporary entry on a
reciprocal basis and of establishing transparent criteria and procedures for temporary entry'
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1. North American Free Trade Agreement [hereinafter "NAFTA], Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Can.-
Mex., 32 I.L.M. 296, art. 1601 (1994).
2. A. James Vasquez-Azpiri, Through the Eye of a Needle: Canadian Information Technology Pro-
fessionals and the Category of the NAFTA, 77 No. 24 INTERPRETER RELEASES 805, 808 (2000).
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but simultaneously acknowledges the apparently competing needs to 'ensure border security
and to protect the domestic labor force and permanent employment'" in each state party's
territory:"3
The frustration within chapter 16 continues with article 1602, "General Obligations:'
which states that each party shall apply the measures of article 1601 "expeditiously ... so
as to avoid unduly impairing or delaying trade in goods or services or conduct of
investment activities under this Agreement."4 This focus on expeditiously applying the
measures after just reading about the focus on border security and domestic labor poses
an interesting contradiction for NAFTA countries.5 As another scholar stated concerning
chapter 16, "It reflects the tension between the goals of preserving national autonomy,
border security, and protecting the permanent employment of each Party's domestic
labor force on the one hand, and encouraging the liberalization of trade on the other."6
In order to understand how this contradiction came about, one would think to
turn to the negotiations concerning the immigration provisions in NAFTA. However,
there does not appear to have been many. While some argue this was a fault of the
negotiation process, "many commentators maintain that the NAFTA was not designed
with the intention of creating a freedom-of-movement-of-person regime:'7
When asked specifically about immigration issues during the negotiations, the Deputy U.S.
Trade Representative stated that 'the issues of immigration... are not considered to be a
subject of the free trade negotiations... When we get into broad scale immigration, you're
not dealing with trade.. . you're dealing with social issues... and we've agreed that will not
be part of this negotiation."
It would seem to contradict all the goals of NAFTA to claim the agreement was
not designed to include provisions for the free movement of people. An immigration
provision is needed to make trade effective. However, "it is an agreement specifically
encouraging the freedom of movement of goods, capital, and services, and which in
conspicuous silence excludes persons from its regime' 9 In fact, in hindsight the lack of
discussion seems to be almost incredulous on the part of the drafters in light of the
overall goals of NAFTA.
Although a consensus exists that such a free flow of capital, goods, and services is a
desirable goal worthy of the three nations' collaborative efforts, the removal or diminu-
tion of each nation's immigration obstacles in order to facilitate the free flow of their
3. Id.; see also Martha J. Schoonover and Kathleen Campbell Walker, Immigration Provisions of
the North American Free Trade Agreement, 94-03 IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS Mar. 1994, at 1.
4. NAFTA, supra note 1, at art. 1602.
5. Vasquez-Azpiri, supra note 2, at 808.
6. Noemi Gal-Or, Labor Mobility under NAFTA: Regulatory Policy Spearheading the Social Supple-
ment to the International Trade Regime, 15 ARIZ. J. INT'L & Comp. L. 365, 379 (1998) (quoting
Ellen G. Yost, NAFTA-Temporary Entry Provisions-Immigration Dimensions, 22 CAN.-U.S.
L.J. 211, 211 (1996)).
7. Id. at 366.
8. Christopher J. Cassise, Note, The European Union v. the United States under the NAFTA: A
Comparative Analysis of the Free Movement of Persons Within the Regions, 46 SYRACUSE L.
REv. 1343, 1372 (1996).
9. Gal-Or, supra note 6, at 366.
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citizens within the NAFTA zone was never seriously discussed during the negotiations
that led to the signing of the treaty10
At the time, maybe immigration did not appear to be a concern in regard to NAFTA,
but the United States Commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, Gene
McNary, could foresee that immigration was a huge part of NAFTA. In fact, in the winter
of 1992, as NAFTA was being negotiated, McNary commented that "if immigration is
not formally on the table, someone at the table will sooner or later realize as a practical
matter that moving goods and services in international commerce also involves moving
the people who trade in those goods and services."'
Thus, if it appears so obvious that one would need to arrange for the movement
of people when negotiating an agreement to move goods and services, then why was it
not a focus? It has been noted that due to the "extremely volatile immigration situation
in United States-Mexican relations, the parties opted to by-pass it to avoid jeopardizing
the real 'directly trade related issues' at stake"' 2 This approach seems logical since it
was challenging enough at the time to get NAFTA passed. Assuming immigration did
cross the drafters' minds, they might have thought it would be better to leave it alone at
least long enough for the agreement to get passed. Therefore, in the short term it was
probably wisest that the negotiators did not dive into complex immigration issues. But
the following question remains to be asked:
How can the United States and Mexico, with a 2,000 mile common border, a combined
population of over 300 million people and an annual flow of legal and illegal entrants in the
millions, not openly deal with the subject of immigration? This question is particularly vital
in the case of the illegal immigration, which can undercut any trade agreement and seriously
impact the relations between the two countries." 3
Thus, unfortunately, the negotiators' "careful tactics" of ignoring the issue have created
more of a divide between immigration in the United States and NAFTA.
When looking at the overall effect of U.S. immigration in NAFTA, one can see that it
is quite limited. "NAFTA does not address permanent immigration. All entries under its
provisions are determined to be temporary, and business persons entering under NAFTA
are presumed to return to their home countries." 4 In looking at the opposite side of the
spectrum, NAFTA does not address illegal immigration either.' It is interesting to note
that although NAFTA never addressed these issues, the controversy of illegal immigration
was a point of issue for the supporters and detractors of NAFTA. 6 "NAFTA supporters
argued that the trade agreement would reduce the illegal immigration in the long run by
stimulating the Mexican economy and thereby creating jobs, increasing wages and raising
the standard of living for Mexicans.' 17 The argument appears somewhat logical except
10. Vasquez-Azpiri, supra note 2, at 808.
11. Gal-Or, supra note 6, at 365.
12. Id. at 366.
13. Alan C. Nelson, NAFTA: Immigration Issues Must Be Addressed, 27 U.C. DAvis L. Rzv. 987,
987 (1994).
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for the fact that immigration and complexities were not a focus in drafting NAFTA.
Post-drafting, however, it turns out to be an objective of NAFTA.
II. Annex to Chapter 16-Immigration Provisions
The majority of the volume of information within chapter 16 is found in annex
1603 on "Temporary Entry for Business Persons." 8 Annex 1603 is composed of four
parts: section A on business visitors, section B on traders and investors, section C on
intra-company transferees, and section D on professionals. 9
"Section A... requires the UNITED STATES, Canada and Mexico to grant tempo-
rary entry to a business person from another NAFTA party who is otherwise qualified
and who seeks to engage in an occupation or profession within one of the seven cat-
egories of business activities listed in Appendix 1603.1 "2" The categories consist of the
following: research and design; growth, manufacture and production; marketing; sales;
distribution; after-sales service; and general service.2' This list is not exclusive. Thus,
a business visitor may be allowed to enter for the purpose of a business not listed in
appendix 1603.1 "as long as the activity is consistent with existing immigration measures
applicable to temporary entry to that country.' 22
Although section A appears to be rather self-explanatory, there are hidden differ-
ences within regarding treatment to Canadians and Mexicans. "Prior to the NAFTA,
Canadian citizens were not required to obtain a visa for entry into the United States, not
even to present a passport at the border.'2 3 Even today with the implementation under
NAFTA, the procedures allowing Canadians to enter the United States are still relatively
relaxed.24 This is due to the fact that the provisions for Canadians under NAFTA are
quite similar to the ones under the U.S.-Canadian Free Trade Agreement (CFTA) regard-
ing the movement of people.2" In fact, "Canadians will be treated no less favorably under
NAFTA than they have been treated under the FTA." 6
Alternatively, for as far as Mexicans entering the United States, the same procedures
of requiring a valid passport or visa are still strongly enforced.27 In addition, when a
professional enters the United States under NAFTA he must show that he is a citizen of
either Canada or Mexico.2S "Mexican citizens are persons who have Mexican nationality,
18. Gal-Or, supra note 6, at 380.
19. NAFTA, at annex 1603.
20. Schoonover, supra note 3, at 5.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Gal-Or, supra note 6, at 381.
24. id.
25. United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement, Jan. 2, 1988, U.S.-Can., 27 I.L.M. 281 (1988);
Ellen G. Yost, NAFTA-Temporary Entry Provisions-Immigration Dimensions, 22 CAN-U.S.
L.J. 211, 215 (1996).
26. Id.
27. Gal-Or, supra note 6, at 381.
28. David B. Etherington & Donna Lea Hawley, Hiring Professionals under NAFTA, IMMIGR.
BRIEFINGS Feb. 1997, at 1.
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have reached the age of 18, and have an honest means of livelihood' 29 Interestingly
enough, "[njo definition of what constitutes a Canadian citizen appears in NAFTA."30
Thus, the drafters made more than obvious the difference in treatment of Canadians over
Mexicans. "Although the NAFTA includes Mexico in the preferential trading relationship
established by the FTA, Chapter 16 does not offer Mexican citizens as easy entry to the
United States as it offers Canadians."3' One possible explanation for this inconsistency is
that the U.S. negotiators were concerned about the accession clause in NAFTA, "and that
any advantages given Mexicans would be available without further negotiations to citizens
of countries acceding to the NAFTA in the future:'32 Another explanation scholars have
mentioned is that the 1990 enactment of the amended Immigration and Nationality Act
that changed U.S. immigration law makes some entries much more difficult.33 Thus,
with the implementation of the new law there was no choice for the drafters but to
follow these new measures of U.S. immigration law.
These differences in treatment between Mexicans and Canadians under NAFTA
regarding immigration are found in various sections under annex 1603, but they do not
appear to be consistent with the goals of NAFTA according to the provisions concerning
national treatment. 4 Article 301 states the following:
1. Each Party shall accord national treatment to the goods of another party...
2. The provisions of paragraph 1 regarding national treatment shall mean, with respect
to a state or province, treatment no less favorable than the most favorable treatment
accorded by such state or province to any like, directly competitive or substitutable
goods, as the case may be, of the Party of which it forms a part.3"
Thus, if the parties are to accord national treatment to the goods of another, then
how can this be plausible if they are not according national treatment from an immi-
gration perspective? Goods are often transported by particularly skilled people, so if the
countries do not have reciprocal requirements involving the movement of people, then
clearly, national treatment is not being followed. By implication, one would think this
standard of treatment also applies to services since they can be seen as the goods of
a country. Therefore, the provisions of chapter 16 appear to be the exception to this
standard.
Section B, Traders and Investors, provisions in NAFTA differ from the reference in
the CFTA between Canada and the United States. The provisions in NAFTA "broaden this
reference to entries to establish, develop, administer, or provide advice or key technical
services to the operation of an investment to which the business person or the business
person's enterprise has committed, or is in the process of committing, a substantial
29. Id. at 3.
30. Id.
31. IMMIGRATION PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE UNDER THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREE-
MENT 2 (Janet H. Cheetham et al. eds., American Immigration Lawyers Association 1995).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. NAFTA, supra note 1, at art. 301.
35. Id.
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amount of capital." A visa requirement is allowed under this section and "it is the only
category which treats Canadians and Mexicans alike" 37
Section C, Intra-Company Transferees, deals with individuals who are transferred
within the same enterprise or its affiliate from one Party to another.3 A Party may
require that such business person shall have been employed continuously by the enter-
prise for one year within the three-year period immediately preceeding the date of the
application for admission."39 The United States maintains this requirement, but Canada
and Mexico have chosen to drop it,4" which focuses on the national treatment concept
mentioned previously. In addition, there is an optional visa requirement, but both Cana-
dian and Mexican employers must file a petition. However, "the Canadians are spared
one step in the processing procedure compared to the steps required from a Mexican
applicant." 4' Canadians are allowed to present their petition at a Class A port of entry
with their own intra-company transferee application.4 "This one-step processing greatly
expedites the procedure for the petitioning employer."4' In contrast, a Mexican national
must process his employer's petition "through one of the four INS regional service cen-
ters [where it] typically takes three to four weeks:'" Thus, the theme in moving people
by not abiding by national treatment continues in section C.
Section D consists of professionals known as the TN ("Trade NAFTA') category.45
The appendix contains a list of sixty-three professions with minimum educational cre-
dentials and "only persons coming to work 'in' one of these enumerated professions may
be accommodated under the TN category. 46 Section D states that no Party to NAFTA
may require prior approval procedures, petitions, labor certification tests, or other pro-
cedures, or impose or maintain any numerical restriction relating to the temporary entry
of Section D professionals under NAFTA.47 "However, Section D [as with other Sections]
preserves the right of a Party to impose a visa requirement on professionals of another
Party,".. . in addition, "[u]nlike the other sections of Annex 1603... Section D allows
a Party to establish an annual numerical limit with regard to professionals of another
NAFTA Party."48
One can easily note the obvious contradictions just within this section. Canadians
can apply for this status when entering the country "without any prior petition or visa
approval" just as they could under the CFTA.49 Mexicans, on the other hand, have
36. Schoonover, supra note 14, at 1.
37. Gal-Or, supra note 6, at 381.
38. Id.
39. NAFTA, supra note 1, at art. 1.
40. Gal-Or, supra note 6, at 373.
41. Id.
42. Gerald A. Wunsch, Why NAFTA's Immigration Provisions Discriminate Against Mexican
Nationals, 5 IND. INT'L & Comp. L. REv. 127, 133 (1994).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Schoonover, supra note 3, at 4.
46. Vasquez-Azpiri, supra note 2, at 809.
47. Wunsch, supra note 42, at 134.
48. Id.
49. Schoonover, supra note 3, at 4.
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to meet the same requirements as other professionals under the H-lB status, such as
obtaining a labor certification from the DOL and following routine INS procedures.5 0
Canadians entering under TN status can work for a U.S. employer or entity or a foreign
employer that provides "prearranged services to a U.S. entity."5 However for Mexicans
entering under TN status, they may enter for work with a U.S. employer.5 2 In addition,
"NAFTA establishes an annual numerical cap on Mexican TN admissions... [such that]
only 5,500 Mexican TN's will be admitted each year for a ten-year period, although the
number may be increased by agreement of the U.S. and Mexican governments.' 53 These
contradictions are stated within an order to "allow" this disparate treatment between
Canadians and Mexicans. "[Tlhe TN application process for Mexican professionals is far
more complex and costly than for Canadian professionals, creating a chilling effect that
has held down the number of TN petitions filed by Mexican citizens." 54
Scholars comment that this difference in treatment of Canadians and Mexicans
throughout annex 1603 is a result of the tightening needed on Mexican immigration to
the United States."5 For example,
[t]he premise underlying NAFTA's annual approval limit of 5,500 petitions for Mexican TN
nationals is that this quota is needed to prevent a flood of cheap labor from entering the
United States to compete with degreed professionals... . NAFTA's contrary premise is that
labor conditions in Canada are so favorable compared to the United States that we need not
concern ourselves about the entry of a horde of degreed professionals from the North.'
Both of these premises appear to be false. During the first six months of NAFTA
zero applications for Mexican nationals for TN status were approved, and when looking
at the acceleration rate of Canadians under the CFTA, "there is every reason to expect
that they will continue an accelerating exodus to the United States under NAFTA."57 But
even if these premises are not exactly accurate, a need to tighten Mexican immigration
remains a likely influence. However, this difference does not follow the national treatment
standard as expressed so clearly in NAFTA.
Besides the differences in treatment within each category, the TN category encoun-
ters various problems of its own in NAFTA. The TN category's purpose was to facilitate
cross-border movement of people between the NAFTA countries; however, the "TN cat-
egory is not functioning as effectively as it could or should.*'5 "The unqualified boon
to cross-border labor mobility between the U.S. and Canada promised at the inception
of the NAFTA has never materialized, and what we have today is a needlessly compli-
cated admission system that is fraught with pitfalls, and often arbitrarily implemented,
and continues to produce an unacceptably high number of denials of application by
50. Id.
51. Etherington, supra note 28.
52. id.
53. 1 Immigr. Law & Bus. §2.76 (2001).
54. Etherington, supra note 28.
55. See Schoonover, supra note 3, at 4.
56. Wunsch, supra note 42, at 141.
57. Id.
58. Vasquez-Azpiri, supra note 2, at 818.
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admissible professionals:' 9 One of the difficulties lies in that the INS has trouble recog-
nizing software engineers as "engineers" under the TN category."0 The INS believes that
the degree or license held by the applicant for admission must be identical to the field
"or even relevant to the profession in which admission is sought:'' INS officials seem
to insist on matching up degree to profession almost exactly, which in turn inhibits the
movement of people and trade under NAFTA.6 2 For example, one can see the prob-
lems that arise for a computer software engineer holding a degree in computer science
when previous versions of the Occupational Outlook Handbook correlated degrees in
computer or electrical engineering for computer engineers and degrees in computer sci-
ence for computer scientists.63 There have been positive changes made correcting this
confusion concerning software engineers with computer science degrees,64 but recently
.a trend among INS offices at the Canadian border to deny TN applications for soft-
ware engineers with computer engineering degrees has emerged."6 The reason for these
denials appears to be an opinion of multiple INS officers that, "in accordance with the
prescriptions of the Occupational Outlook Handbook, persons with computer engineer-
ing degrees are more appropriately classified under NAFTA as Hardware Engineers or
Computer Systems Analysts than as Software Engineers."66 As one can see, there are vari-
ous problems between the rigid immigration rules and the push to allow free movement
of people for labor-mobility.
Clearly, these tensions between U.S. immigration and NAFTA are not welcomed by
the other NAFTA countries. An author in THE ECONOMIST in 2000 noted the following:
The contradictions in America's immigration laws are becoming increasingly awkward to live
with. Canada is getting cross with a partner who insists on ever freer trade but keeps on
erecting barriers at its frontier. Some people ask whether a trade block need necessarily involve
the free movement of labor as well as that of capital and goods.67
Regarding the TN entry problem, some believe the fault lies with the INS officers
"who lack adequate training, and whose principal motivation, arguably in violation of
Article 1602 of NAFTA, is not to promote the free flow of services, but misunderstanding
or ignoring NAFTA's basic function of providing temporary labor mobility rather than
facilitating immigration to protect the U.S. work force."
68
Finally, what is another country to do in reaction to such "trade barriers?" Unfortu-
nately, there is not a specific dispute resolution provision within Chapter 16 of NAFTA.69
"When faced with a Party's refusal to grant temporary entry, another Party may not
59. Id.
60. Id. at 810.
61. Id. at 811.
62. Id. at 811-12.




67. Id. at 818-19.
68. Id. at 820.
69. Ellen Ginsberg Yost, Immigration Provisions of the North American Free Trade Agreement, 515
PLI/LIT 9, 39 (1994).
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invoke the NAFTA's overall dispute settlement provisions unless it can demonstrate that
the denial arises out of a pattern of repeated practices and that the business person has
exhausted available administrative remedies.'7 Therefore, it is not easy to resolve these
tensions and contradictions within the rules of NAFTA.
When these tensions of national treatment and contradictory actions taking place at
the border rise to the surface, many people brush them aside and reiterate that NAFTA
"did not seek to harmonize their immigration regimes or to create a common labor
market or passport union"71 such as the European Union did. This argument is an
easy way to dismiss the inconsistencies and problems with immigration under NAFTA.
Although NAFTA does not have the same goals as a common labor market, the goals it
states within the agreement must be clear and recognized in practice. Even if the actual
immigration procedures were never meant to be harmonized, one would think that the
basic goals among the NAFTA countries should be harmonized.
Canada is more interested in, and hence committed to, using immigration as a strategy to
invite human capital and attract talent. Unlike the UNITED STATES, where size and pros-
perity foster a sense of economic self-sufficiency, Canada realizes that, in an increasingly
competitive global economy, it is impossible to have free trade without the companion move-
ment of people.2
The United States does not appear to need this influx of people as much as Canada,
but they are both part of a free trade agreement and thus need to find a way where the
restrictions on the movement of people do not become a barrier to trade. For exam-
ple, "while accepting employment-based immigration, the UNITED STATES does not
seek to encourage it or endow it with the integrity that is its only enduring justifi-
cation... [but] Canada needs, even invites, temporary employment from abroad to a
far greater extent than the UNITED STATES" 73 NAFTA is a free trade agreement and
differences are allowed. But differences that inhibit trade should be addressed. United
States Immigration discussions were not a focus during the negotiations of NAFTA and,
although they are a material part of NAFTA's everyday existence, they still do not seem
to be a focus.
III. European Union and Immigration
The European Community has approached immigration in a much different way
than the United States has with Canada and Mexico. It is definitely agreed that "freedom
of movement is a privilege that the EU wants to limit to EU nationals only.'74 In 1990,
70. Id. at 39-40.
71. IMMIGRATION PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE UNDER THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREE-
MENT, supra note 31, at 3.
72. Asher Frankel & Gary Endelman, Go North Young Man, Go North: Working Temporarily in
Canada from an American Perspective, 77 No. 3 INTERPRETER RELEASES 73, 87 (2000).
73. Id.
74. Kerry E. McCarron, The Schengen Convention as a Violation of International Law and the
Need for Centralized Adjudication on the Validity of National and Multilateral Asylum Policies
for Members of the United Nations, 18 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 401, 408 (1995).
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the EU took action to create a "common Community immigration policy" known as
the Dublin Convention." This convention dealt with asylum and refugee laws. The next
move towards a common immigration policy came with the Maastricht Treaty.76 "As
the successor to both the Common Market of 1958 and the free movement of trade
implemented by the 1987 Single European Act, this Treaty was slated to create a cohesive
political and economic union'"77 The Maastricht Treaty concerned immigration, but with
a strong focus on human rights. 78
This focus on a common immigration policy continued with the Schengen Agree-
ment in 1985, which "addresses all issues relating to the circulation of persons.' 79 The
Schengen Agreement contains many measures of immigration including:
abolition of identification checks at internal EU borders, the unification of controls at the
external borders of the Schengen nations, the introduction of principles for a joint policy
on visas, requirements for determining which of the Schengen countries is responsible for
asylum applications submitted to one of the Schengen countries, procedures for joint workings
between the police and the judiciaries of the Schengen countries, and the establishment of a
centralized information system (SIS).' °
By reading these measures, one can gain an understanding of how different immi-
gration is within the EU. Although the Schengen Agreement is not officially an EU
agreement, but rather a forum for those member states who wish to participate, it is
considered an EU document since only Denmark and the United Kingdom have not
joined." In 1990, the Agreement became known as the Schengen Convention when "ten
out of the fifteen current EU members agreed to abolish internal frontiers and cooperate
in an effort to enforce external borders' 2 As clarified in the measures stated above, the
main purpose and theme of the Schengen Agreement is to allow "the complete freedom
for any person to cross the internal borders of any member of the Schengen Group."83
Clearly, this is an agreement with the intention of making the immigration rules flexible
by declaring complete freedom and, most importantly, uniformity to the members of
the agreement; however, "the Convention will defer to national policies for compelling
reasons:'8 4 With that addition, one can see a slight resemblance between NAFTA and the
Convention as far as the importance of national policies and protecting the border, but
to a different degree than what NAFTA promotes.
Although the E.U. is not a free trade area like NAFTA, for the purpose of comparison
it is helpful to see how the members of the EU interact via immigration. In order to
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 408-09.
78. Id. at 409.
79. id.
80. Id. at 409-410.
81. Id. at 410.
82. Giovanna I. Wolf, Efforts Toward 'An Ever Closer" European Union Confront Immigration
Barriers, 4 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 223, 225 (1996). ("Schengen essentially served as an
'experimental garden' or 'dress rehearsal' for Union-wide integration')
83. McCarron, supra note 73, at 410.
84. id.
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understand the differences in their goals, it is important to see how the EU was formed.
After World War II, Europeans began feeling a need to integrate in order to provide
a sense of security that "national avarice or continental domination would no longer
be a threat to European peace and prosperity.'' 5 Thus, the European Coal and Steel
Community ("ECSC"), developed in 1951, began in 1950 with the fusion of French and
German coal and steel industries.86 Further negotiations developed a few years later with
the goal of integrating the atomic energy industry and discussing a common market.87 A
few years later in 1957, the European Atomic Energy Community ("Euratom") and the
European Economic Community ("EEC") were signed in Rome to take effect in 1958.88
Additionally, treaties such as the Single European Act ("SEA") in 1986 and the Treaty on
European Unity ("TEU") in 1992 were signed later to further European integration. 89
Therefore, the differences in the motivations and goals of forming a "union" between the
members of the European Community and the members of NAFTA are distinguished
on the premise of why each "community" was formed to begin with. Europe's premise
appears to have begun by social, moral and economic factors after a devastating war,
while NAFTAs was primarily for economics and free trade.
This difference between the EU and NAFTA becomes even more prevalent when
one notes that the EU realized early on the importance of addressing immigration.
The drafters of the ECSC, Euratom, and EEC treaties acknowledged that in order to truly
integrate the economies of Europe it would be necessary to tear down all the barriers inhibit-
ing the free movement of workers. Title III of part two of the EEC Treaty entitles the free
movement of persons, services, and capital and explicitly creates a right of free movement
throughout Europe for EU nationals."
More specifically to the movement of people in a trade/employment, Article 48, Section 3
addresses the following:
1. It shall entail the right, subject to the limitations justified on grounds of public
policy, public security or health:
a. to accept offers of employment actually made;
b. to move freely within the territory of Member States for this purpose;
c. to stay in a Member State for the purpose of employment in accordance
with the provisions governing the employment of nationals of that State
laid down by law, regulation or administrative action;
d. to remain in the territory of a Member State after having been employed in
that State, subject to conditions which shall be embodied in implementing
regulations to be drawn up by the Commission.9
85. Cassise, supra note 8, at 1344-45.
86. Id. at 1345.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1347.
90. Id. at 1349-50.
91. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Nov. 10, 1997, O.J. (c340) 3 (1997),
available at http://www.hni.org/docs/Rome57/Part3Title03.htm [hereinafter EEC Treaty].
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The movement of people within the EU for employment purposes appears much
more feasible than in NAFTA. The immense conflict found in chapter 16 of NAFTA that
focuses on protecting one's borders while encouraging the movement of people is not as
prevalent in the EEC Treaty. In addition, article 50 adds to this theme by declaring that
"Member States shall... encourage the exchange of young workers.' From NAFTA, one
gets a sense that the movement of people is allowed, but, from these articles of the EEC
Treaty, the sense is that movement is not only allowed, but highly encouraged.
The exact definition of a "worker" for purposes of article 48 in the EEC Treaty
has been somewhat of an issue throughout the member states and European Court of
Justice.93 The treaty has not explicitly laid out a definition for the term "persons" or
the term "worker:' However, the European Court of Justice has "held that the term
'worker' must have a community meaning and can not be determined by each individual
Member States?' 94 The court also recognized that "an EU national may move and reside
throughout Europe in search of employment for a reasonable duration with these rights
fully protected by Community law.'9 5 Therefore, the term "worker" in the EU context
goes beyond the commonly accepted definition and includes those who are simply aiming
to be "workers."
Along with the people's freedom to move, the EU has many provisions that extend
this freedom immensely. For example, Council Directive 68/360 states that EU nationals
have a right to residence in another member state where they are employed.9 s This
concept would seem unimaginable within NAFTA--especially with the treatment granted
Mexican nationals and the time limits imposed on them in certain situations while they
are working in the United States. The residence permit granted to the EU National will
last five years and it can be automatically renewed.97 This permit can be taken away if the
permit holder voluntarily terminates his job, but not if the termination is involuntary or
if he is unable to work because of illness or injury.98 Thus, not only do these provisions
in the EEC Treaty provide flexibility regarding employment, but also security if one loses
his job.
The Right of Establishment is another provision within the EEC Treaty that is not
only extreme in comparison to NAFTA, but actually is something that the United States
specifically prohibits business professionals from engaging in (as far as self-employment
is concerned). The Right of Establishment as stated in Article 52 states that this freedom
includes "the right to take up and pursue activities as self-employed persons and to
set up and manage undertakings, in particular companies or firms... ,99 The General
Programme for the Freedom of Establishment "prohibits regulations or administrative
action that hinders the establishment of an EU entrepreneur."" Under NAFTA, the
economic goals do involve the hope that living conditions will improve in Mexico, but
92. Id. art. 50.
93. Cassise, supra note 8, at 1350.
94. Id. at 1350-51.
95. Id. at 1351-52.
96. Id. at 1353.
97. Id. at 1354.
98. Id.
99. EEC Treaty, art. 52.
100. Cassise, supra note 8, at 1356.
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the general economic focus when the movements of people are concerned is on each
country's individual economy. The United States has to limit the number of Mexican
Nationals entering under TN status, for example, so as to protect U.S. jobs and keep
Mexicans from abusing the system. From analyzing the EU's Right of Establishment
provision, the focus is on the EU as a whole. The question that seems to arise is "what
can make the EU stronger and better?" not "what can make member state X stronger?"
Therefore, the member states welcome self-employed individuals along with the free
movement of people.
From employed to self-employed, the movement of people also encompasses those
who render and receive services within the European Community. Article 60 of the EEC
Treaty contains a non-exhaustive list of services-such as activities of a commercial char-
acter of craftsmen.' 0' "The European Court of Justice has interpreted article 60 as includ-
ing tourism, medical treatment, and education as services." 2 At the end of article 60,
it states that "the person providing the service may, in order to do so, temporarily pursue
his activity in the State where the service is provided, under the same conditions as are
imposed by that State on its own nationals. ' 10 3 As seen before, there is a right of residence,
but here only for the period of time necessary to render the service.1 4 Once again, there
is this reiteration throughout the Articles dealing with the movement of people that such
movement is welcomed and encouraged.
Although the borders within the EU appear to be completely open, there are limita-
tions. For example, "[tihe public policy, health, and security provision may be invoked
in matters concerning entry, issue or renewal of residence permits, or expulsion."' This
provision is found in article 56 as follows: "The provisions of this Chapter and measures
taken in pursuance thereof shall not prejudice the applicability of provisions laid down
by law, regulation or administrative action providing for special treatment for foreign
nationals on grounds of public policy, public security or public health."0°6 Due to the
broadness of this provision, the European Court of Justice defined this provision more
clearly in Van Duyn v. Home Office, which involved the UK and a Dutch National.0 7 The
UK refused entry to the Dutch National because he had a job at the British branch of
the Church of Scientology and the UK found the teachings of the church to be "socially
harmful."' The Court agreed with this justification." In another case involving public
policy, the Court explained "that the threat must be one which involves 'genuine and
sufficiently serious threat affecting one of the fundamental interests of society.' Thus,
the individual must engage in conduct that the Member State has explicitly prohibited
within the confines of reasonableness' 0
101. EEC Treaty, supra note 90, art. 60; Cassise, supra note 8, at 1358.
102. Id. at 1358.
103. EEC Treaty, supra note 90, at art. 60.
104. Cassise, supra note 8, at 1359.
105. Id. at 1361.
106. EEC Treaty, supra note 90, at art. 56.
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Along the same lines is another limitation-that in the public sector. The EEC
Treaty "restricts the employment of EU foreign nationals in the public sector of another
Member State."" In a case involving Belgium, the European Court of Justice defined
public sector employment as "occupations that 'put the holder's thereof in the position of
directly participating in the exercise of official authority or of making use of prerogatives
in the nature of powers conferred by public law in regard to members of the public: ""
As in NAFTA, there is a sense of protectionism here, but not in an economic/protect the
border sense. The protection is more aligned with social welfare and internal structure,
which appears to be where the EU's focus is in comparison with NAFTA's focus,' 3
As shown from the principles, concepts and excerpts from the EEC Treaty, the goals
and motives of the EU regarding free movement of people are entirely distinct from those
of NAFTA. "Where the EU used free movement as a founding principle and inseparable
issue, the U.S. has used NAFTA in an attempt to stop flows of Mexican immigrants:"14
This thought takes one back to the original negotiations again. It was always understood
that the United States, Mexico and Canada "never intended on negotiating a 'social
compact' comparable to the Union in Europe.""5 Besides the intentions of the drafters
of the respective treaties, the time at which each treaty was enacted also had a significant
impact on the formation."" For example, EU "began somewhat as a reaction to the
height of the Cold War" and NAFTA was born in a time of sweeping immigration laws
and large scale problems of Mexican illegal immigration."' Therefore, the respective
backgrounds of each agreement reflect their particular goals and needs. The various
European countries needed to band together and unite after a terrible war, thus this
social and economic union is evolving. NAFTA, however, was negotiated at a time where
many supported expanding trade as well as restricting immigration.
IV. The Problem... and Now the Solution
Part I of this paper depicted the problem with chapter 16 under NAFTA. The prob-
lem begins with the conflicting principles spelled out in the text of chapter 16. It appears
to encourage the views of the EU at one level and then returns to a very nationalistic
and protectionist view. In practice the problems only continue. The National Treat-
ment standard disappears in chapter 16 as Mexicans are discriminated against constantly
throughout the provisions of annex 1603. In addition, as technology advances and new
professions arise under TN status, such as computer software engineers, INS agents
111. Id. at 1363.
112. Id.
113. However, there is a provision within Chapter 16 of the NAFTA that "states that a Party may
refuse employment authorization if the temporary entry might adversely affect the settlement
of a labor dispute in progress at the place or intended place of employment or which might
affect the employment of any person who is involved in such a dispute.' Yost, supra note 25,
at 225.
114. Cassise, supra note 8, at 1371.
115. Id. at 1371-72.
116. Id. at 1373-74.
117. Id. at 1374.
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at the border cannot seem to keep up with these advancements and thereby inhibit
such progress. So how does one fix these significant discrepancies? How does one make
NAFT~s chapter 16 more like the movement of people provisions in the EEC Treaty?
The answer is not to become more like the EU. The countries of NAFTA are not
prepared for an absolute freedom of the movement of people. The difficulties in dealing
with immigration are completely valid. The growing population of illegal immigrants in
the United States is a critical concern. Thus, it makes perfect sense as to why the nego-
tiators of NAFTA did not want to even begin to discuss this issue. "[hIf NAFTA had dealt
with immigration, it presumably would have responded to domestic political pressures
in the United States and restricted, not liberalized from Mexico to this country.""' But
now the countries are at a different point.
Immigration discussions are occurring on various levels and they need to occur in
regard to NAFTA. NAFTA needs to work towards the solution and not towards the prob-
lem. "NAFTA, though not squarely addressing immigration, does nothing to change the
dynamics allowing for a significant undocumented Mexican labor force to participate in
the U.S. economy with precious few civil rights."I 9 Now is the time to negotiate because
"NAFTA reinforces the immigration status quo between the two nations at a time when
economic and other pressures favor change. ' 120 As stated previously, the United States
never intended to negotiate NAFTA in the hopes of furthering social policy or issues.'
This statement should be restated that the United States never intended to negotiate
NAFTA in the hopes of furthering social policy or issues at that time; however, it can
only be expected that these issues would rise to this level and beg for attention at some
point. And as time continues and Mexico, Canada and the United States develop their
trading relationship further, it can only be expected that tensions involving social issues
will only increase. The social troubles must be addressed in order to ease the immigra-
tion tension and thus make NAFTA a more productive document in terms of movement
of people. A simple pact liberalizing immigration would not solve this problem. Actu-
ally, it would probably make matters worse. Rather, to "facilitate meaningful change; the
nations would need to confront the social and economic forces that maintain the current
system:?12 2 Thus, ultimately "if change in the migration patterns between the United
States and Mexico is desired, it is necessary to address the underlying causes, rather than
attempt to modify them through law alone: ' 123
Although the idea of analyzing the problem on a social level seems to be a possible
solution, it may not be a realistic answer (at least in the short term) as can be seen by
the many struggles the EU is facing on that front. There is certainly a global immigration
crisis and "free movement of people and the opening of borders within the European
Union raises fears in the Member States of renewed waves of legal and illegal immigrants
118. Kevin R. Johnson, An Essay on Immigration, Citizenship, And U.S./Mexico Relations: The Tale
of Two Treaties, 5 Sw. J. L. & TRADE Am. 121, 125 (1998).
119. Id. at 126.
120. Id.
121. Cassise, supra note 8, at 1371-72.
122. Johnson, supra note 117, at 139-140.
123. Id. at 140.
682 Law and Business Review of the Americas
and of refugees seeking political asylum:"24 European Union borders have been "open"
since 1992 and from the start "the free movement of persons has raised serious problems.
Controls and protections are needed against drug smugglers, illegal immigrants, terror-
ists, and political refugees" 25 Therefore, social integration is not evolving as quickly as
hoped. 26
In fact, in some cases it appears that the European Union is having to step back from
their original agreements and tighten some borders for various reasons. For example,
France (a Schengen country) who has been concerned with security issues and possibly
fearful of the increasing terrorism in the world "insists both on tighter controls at exter-
nal borders and tougher visa laws in other Schengen countries."11g Meanwhile, Spain has
"threatened to suspend the Schengen provisions on legal cooperation" so as not to have
to comply with an extradition order.'28 Therefore, the movement of people is not as easy
and simplified as the EEC Treaty makes it out to be. The EU is encountering problems
that the United States seeks to avoid by restricting their immigration provisions and
focusing on border security in chapter 16 of NAFTA.
So where is the solution? It appears from the various agreements trying to extend
the borders in the EU, in the hopes of economic and social integration, that the Member
States have found many more problems than expected. Thus, from using their experience,
open and free borders within the NAFTA countries are not a reasonable solution to
address the underlying differences between those countries. Rather, NAFTA itself is a
reasonable solution.
The Treaties of the EU have established an open system allowing for the free move-
ment of people, while NAFTA has been much more restrictive in its approach, but
much more effective for the purposes of free trade including the movement of peo-
ple. NAFTA and its conservative approach is a useful tool in "addressing" immigration
(even if implicitly), as long as it is used correctly. As stated previously, many believe that
NAFTA has been used to stop, or at least reduce, the flood of illegal Mexican immi-
grants into the United States. Therefore, such motives would explain the discrepancies
that exist within NAFTA between Canada and Mexico. But NAFTA needs to start being
used as a more persuasive tool. NAFTA is already such a strong and powerful instrument
within other areas of trade that in chapter 16 it needs to carry this attitude as well. For
example, article 1601 of chapter 16 notes the importance of ensuring border security
and protecting the domestic labor force-along with promoting free trade.'29 Therefore,
instead of furthering this contradiction throughout the rest of the chapter and annexes,
NAFTA should be consistent and fair in order to justify it.
Annex 1603 addresses the four categories of people who are qualified to move
between the borders under NAFTA. As mentioned previously, there are constant con-
tradictions between the treatment of Canadians and Mexicans. Now that the issue of
124. Guy de Lusignan, Global Migration and European Integration, 2 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD.
179, 179 (1994).
125. Id. at 186.
126. Wolf, supra note 81, at 226.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. NAFTA, supra note 1, at chap. 16, art. 1601.
Fall 2002 683
immigration has become even more prevalent and NAFTA has already been passed, rep-
resentatives from the NAFTA countries should meet to resolve these discrepancies. The
answer need not be in the form of the EU's provisions, but it should be clear and uni-
form. These ambiguities and inconsistencies not only hurt the strength and effectiveness
of chapter 16, but also further the social divide between Mexicans and Americans,'30
which in turn only contributes to the problems such as illegal immigration that NAFTA
is trying to reduce.
In detail, NAFTA should reevaluate the provisions located in annex 1603 in a fair
and uniform manner. As long as restrictions are consistent, free trade can be effective and
uninhibited by immigration obstacles. Since Mexico is presumably a part of this prefer-
ential trading relationship under NAFTA, the process for Mexicans to enter the United
States under NAFTA needs to be more parallel with the process Canadians endure. As
long as the restrictions are upheld and the guidelines for each qualified section within
annex 1603 are met, then the inherent goal of chapter 16 to protect the sovereign would
remain intact and free trade would actually be furthered under the National Treatment
standard used throughout NAFTA. "Congress recognized the difficulty of trying to stem
the flow of illegal migration through unilateral action and concluded that close consulta-
tion and cooperation with Mexico and Canada were essential:"'" Such close consultation
and cooperation are needed in NAFTA.
Therefore, NAFTA is in need of many modifications in order to be used effectively
for the movement of people. Additional visa requirements for Mexicans under sections
A and D should be amended similar to those in place for the Canadians. If the Mexican
national meets the requirements to enter under the particular category, why is there
an additional obstacle? At this level, the person is a Mexican professional, not one that
can be generally equated with the stereotypical illegal immigration problem. And the
numerical cap within the TN category also involves Mexican professionals. If the Cana-
dian professionals and the Mexican professionals are judged by the same standards, then
why should there be a cap on one and not on the other? The additional processing
requirement for Mexicans under section C also seems excessive. At this point the Mex-
ican and the Canadian alike both have their petition signed by their employer to be
transferred within the company. The Canadian is able to process the petition right there
at the border while the Mexican has to wait weeks while it is processed in a regional INS
Center. Additional procedures such as this one do not seem to have any purpose, but
for delaying the Mexican national. When such restrictions are in effect, then free trade
is inhibited. These are examples of when protective restrictions are used incorrectly.
Continuing with section D, clearly, in order for the TN category to work effec-
tively, INS inspectors at border crossings need to be informed of the latest group of
professionals considered to be a part of the category. The problems Canadians have been
facing with their degrees not exactly matching with their qualified jobs should not be
occurring. Computer software engineers not being admitted because their profession is
questionable as an engineer is ridiculous. Once again, this is an example of a restriction,
imposed for the purpose of granting entry to a limited category, which is not being used
correctly and thus inhibits trade.
130. Johnson, supra note 117, at 126.
131. Yost, supra note 25, at 222.
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V. Conclusion
Therefore, what this paper proposes is an enhanced NAFTA. It does not appear that
the EU knows the best way to handle the movement of people. The Treaties of the EU
have granted almost absolute freedom of the movement of people, which looks ideal, but
causes many problems that have been discussed within. Some amount of control needs
to be maintained, but the ultimate question is how much and how evenly spread should
the control be among the various parties. "In an era when states are ever more eager
to cooperate with each other to achieve economic integration by lowering trade barriers
and relaxing controls over cross-border economic exchange, some are intensifying their
efforts to police cross-border flows of persons" 32 Such efforts to guard or police borders
do not have to inhibit trade as long as the methods are used correctly with the purpose
of protecting borders and allowing professionals to cross the various borders in order to
further the goal of free trade under NAFTA.
132. Vasquez-Azpiri, supra note 2, at 820.
